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a "ne of the most difficult tasks faced
by any central bank is explaining to the
public the role that interest rates play in
the conduct of monetary policy. The
common understanding is that the Fed-
eral Reserve fights inflation by acting to
raise short-term interest rates. But as
pointed out by economist Irving Fisher
many years ago, reduced inflation is
associated with lower, not higher, rates
of interest.
The key distinction between these two
views, of course, lies in the short-run
versus the long-run level of interest
rates. However, the transit to the long
run depends crucially on private expec-
tations, which in turn depend on how the
public perceives particular decisions in
the short run.
This issue is of great practical impor-
tance. By the end of the 1970s, inflation
was hovering around 13 percent. With
the announcement on October 6,1979,
of the switch from interest-rate targeting
to nonborrowed reserves targeting, U.S.
monetary policy adopted a strong anti-
inflationary stance. The new approach
was successful in that inflation was cut
to around 4 percent by the end of 1983.
During this same period, however, the
economy suffered twin recessions.
Many, if not most, economists attribute
the losses in jobs and output to slowly
adjusting inflation expectations.
A debate is now under way about
whether another monetary policy revolu-
tion is needed. The argument this time
focuses on whether the Federal Reserve
should pursue price stability. Like the
last battle, the new one could also prove
costly unless the Fed can credibly signal
its commitment to price stability and
then follow that policy relentlessly.
This Economic Commentary explores
the paradoxical link between interest
rates and inflation in the short versus the
long run. It may be more difficult for a
central bank to achieve credibility — and
hence a less costly transition to a stable
price environment — without first mak-
ing the monetary authorities accountable
for publicly stated multiyear objectives
for the price level.
• Inflation and Monetary Policy
Years ago, Milton Friedman issued his
now-famous maxim that inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phe-
nomenon.
1 This statement is as true
today as it was three decades ago. Of
course, every blip in the Consumer Price
Index is not caused by Federal Reserve
policy. Supply shocks, such as the oil
shock in the mid-1970s, can lead to short
periods in which the price level rises
rapidly. But continuous increases in the
price level can occur only if the central
bank accommodates such shocks with
faster money growth.
This sounds simple enough. One can see
why Friedman once called for the Fed to
set the growth rate of money at 3 percent
per year (the long-run growth rate of out-
put), declare the battle over, and go
home. Alas, life is not that simple. It is
doubtful that a constant money growth
rule would be sufficient to achieve a
Central banks wishing to pursue price
stability must deal with the paradox
that reducing inflation today requires
raising short-term interest rates, even
though price stability can ultimately
be sustained only with lower, not
higher, rates of interest. Without a
long-term objective, such as a multi-
year path for the price level, it may be
extraordinarily difficult for a central
bank to signal its resolve to stabilize
prices.long-run price-level target, and even
when particular money growth ranges are
desired, such targets are typically sought
via changes in short-term interest rates.
Interest-rate operating procedures are
uniformly used by the world's central
banks for a variety of reasons, but many
economists believe it is desirable to
smooth short-term interest-rate fluctua-
tions arising from the temporary liquid-
ity needs of the financial sector. Since
people are unable to adjust their portfo-
lios quickly in response to various
shocks to the economy, the central bank
should jump in and supply the needed
liquidity by adding enough reserves to
smooth interest rates.
In the United States, the interest rate used
to conduct monetary policy is the federal
funds rate — the rate that banks charge
each other for overnight loans. As with
other central banks, the Federal Reserve
does not directly control the money sup-
ply. Rather, it varies the supply of bank
reserves to achieve its funds-rate objec-
tive. Under an interest-rate operating pro-
cedure, money growth, which determines
the price level and thus the purchasing
power of money, is endogenous. To
understand how monetary policy affects
both short- and long-run price-level
movements, it is necessary to understand
the relationship between interest rates
and money growth.
• Money Growth and the Funds
Rate: The Long and Short of It
According to conventional wisdom,
interest-rate hikes are supposed to fight
inflation. The mechanism by which
these actions operate in the short run is
straightforward: Increases in the funds
rate lead to slower money growth.
Slower money growth should in turn
lead to lower inflation.
But what about in the long run? One of
the strongest correlations in economics
is the positive relationship between
inflation and nominal interest rates (see
figure 1). In light of this, and given that
monetary policy operates via interest
rates, it seems fair to ask whether the
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seeds of future inflation are being planted
with interest-rate hikes that must ulti-
mately be supported by excess money
creation.
As pointed out by economist Irving
Fisher, nominal interest rates, like the
fed funds rate, contain both a real rate
and an inflation premium. In general, the
higher the inflation premium, the higher
are nominal rates. In the long run, then,
higher nominal interest rates do in fact
accompany higher inflation.
Thus, we are left to contend with a
paradox: Although higher federal funds
rates may be associated with an anti-
inflationary policy in the short run,
lower inflation will ultimately be re-
flected in lower interest rates. The key to
understanding this puzzle is the critical
role played by inflation expectations.
In the near term, because inflation
expectations are fixed, a higher funds
rate can be supported by increasing the
real (inflation-adjusted) funds rate via
slower money growth. In the long run,
however, the Fed has little or no effect
on real economic variables — and hence
on real interest rates. This means that
over the long term, a high funds rate can
be supported only with faster money
growth and increased inflation expecta-
tions. Thus, an interest-rate hike that is
not rescinded once the economy fully
adjusts to it can in fact cause higher
long-term inflation. Figures 2 and 3
show that although there is a weak nega-
tive relationship between changes in the
funds rate and monetary base growth
over a quarterly frequency, over the long
run a positive relationship exists.
The line of demarcation between the
short run and the long run is not a fixed
period like one day, one year, or even
one decade. Rather, it is crucially related
to the amount of time it takes for expec-
tations to adjust. This adjustment period
— that is, how long the "short run" lasts
— is ultimately an empirical issue. How-
ever, the tight relationship between the
funds rate and inflation suggests that the
long-run correlations noted by Irving
Fisher are apparent in the data.
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• Interest Rates and Credibility
The seeds of the paradox are now sown:
What should a central bank do if it
wishes to reduce inflation and pursue
price stability? Complicating this issue
is the problematic nature of the signals
that particular funds-rate decisions give
about the Fed's overall objective. While
increasing the funds rate may result in
slower short-term money growth and
hence in lower short-term inflation, it
may be a poor way for a central bank to
signal its resolve to pursue price stabil-
ity. Eventually, a lower, not higher,
funds rate will be necessary to support
price stability. But failing to raise the
rate may be just as unlikely to signal the
Fed's resolve to cut inflation. An un-
changed funds rate in the face of in-
creasing market interest rates may fuel
short-term inflation and make it difficult
for the Fed to convince the public that it
is serious about controlling inflation
over the long term.FIGURE 2 MONETARY BASE GROWTH AND
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FIGURE 3 MONETARY BASE GROWTH AND THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
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Whether increases in the funds rate can
adequately signal a central bank's resolve
to lower long-term inflation depends on
what people expect future monetary pol-
icy to be. When the Fed raises the funds
rate, do people expect that four years into
the future the rate will be higher or lower
than it otherwise would have been?
4
This is a hard question to answer empiri-
cally, but to believe that a higher funds
rate signals lower long-term inflation is
to believe that it also signals a lower
long-term funds rate. If people actually
expect the funds rate several years hence
to be higher following a funds rate hike,
the cost of achieving price stability will
be unnecessarily steep. This is because
the rate hike may be successful in slow-
ing short-term inflation, but will actually
increase the market's expectations of
longer-term inflation.
So how should an inflation-conscious
central bank proceed? The answer obvi-
ously depends on whether one believes
that increases in the fed funds rate can, in
and of themselves, credibly signal a
change in the long-term inflation rate.
The paradox discussed in this section
points out in a particularly stark manner
what the market must believe about the
course of future fed funds decisions if it
is in fact to believe that long-term infla-
tion expectations will fall when short-
term interest rates are raised.
Even if one believes that interest-rate
hikes lower long-term inflation expecta-
tions, the monetary authorities still face
a difficult task. The funds rate must be
raised today to fight inflation, then
brought back down in the future as
inflation expectations adjust. If the Fed
usually decreases the funds rate before
expectations have adjusted, inflation
will rise, partially undoing the inflation-
fighting signal sent by the initial rate
hike. Yet, paradoxically, consistent fail-
ure to decrease the funds rate after
expectations have adjusted can also
increase inflation. After expectations
have fallen into line, a high fed funds
rate can be supported only via faster
money growth.
• A Possible Course
for Monetary Policy
A monetary authority that wishes to pur-
sue price stability has its job compli-
cated enormously both by the seeming
paradox that lowering interest rates in
the long run may require raising them in
the short run, and by the subtle but im-
portant role that near-term funds-rate de-
cisions play in the formation of private
expectations. Consequently, more funda-
mental changes may be required than
simply adjusting the short-term funds
rate. A sensible place for an inflation-
conscious central bank to start is to
adopt publicly announced multiyear
paths for the price level.
This institutional change would likely
mitigate the dilemma discussed in the
previous section. The goal is to get peo-
ple thinking about monetary policy in
terms of objectives rather than as a series
of short-term interest-rate changes.
Without long-term goals, a person's best
guess of the federal funds rate one year
hence is likely to be dominated by the
current rate. In the absence of explicit
guidelines, history serves as our only
teacher.
Multiyear price-level commitments
would help people see short-term hikes
in the funds rate in a different context. A
rate increase today would necessarily be
viewed as a temporary measure taken tomeet tomorrow's long-term policy goals,
ending the contradictory signals that
people now must deal with when trying
to predict future policy on the basis of
current actions.
Undoubtedly, this change alone would
not magically give central bankers the
credibility they need to minimize the
costs of disinflation. Without such a
commitment, however, short-term
increases in the funds rate are less likely
to signal a central bank's seriousness
about achieving long-term price stability.
This is especially true when such hikes,
if left unchanged, are consistent with
higher long-term inflation. Multiyear
price-level paths are therefore a poten-
tially important first step in reducing the
costs of disinflation and will likely
improve any cost/benefit calculation.
• Footnotes
1. See Milton Friedman, "Inflation: Causes
and Consequences," in Dollars and Deficits,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968,
p. 39.
2. The fed funds rate target may be set in
order to achieve a particular money growth
objective, in which case money growth is at
least partially controlled by the central bank.
3. Some argue that the positive relationship
between inflation and the funds rate exists
because the Federal Reserve chooses to fight
inflation by raising the funds rate during
inflationary periods. I believe that in all like-
lihood, both mechanisms are operating.
4. I arbitrarily chose four years to convey an
interval in which people's expectations of the
real funds rate at the end of the period are
independent of whether short-term interest
rates are raised today.
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